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WHERE'S WALDO? WHO'S ASKING?!!? A BETTER
WAY To THINK ABOUT LOCATION DATA PRIVACY

By: Mark Basanta*

Introduction
The information age has wrought technology inconceivable to people of any prior age in
human history.

As the name suggests, this age is "marked by the increased production,

transmission, consumption of and reliance on information." 1

True to form, Americans are

prolific data producers? We generate approximately 2.5 quintillion bytes of data every day. 3
Roughly speaking, this is more than 13 trillion books or 90 million Blu-Ray discs worth of data

every day. 4

Rightly or wrongly, we expect our data to be private. 5

expectation is under assault from two overwhelming forces.

Unfortunately, that

Against the market forces of

commerce 6 and the coercive power of the state, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their ...
papers, and effects" 7 is more threatened now than at any time since 1789. However, the nature
of the Fourth Amendn1ent and the current state of its jurisprudence means that we cannot rely on
it for personal privacy in this age. 8 Therefore, legislators must fill the weighty role of privacy
protectors to the American people. But try as they have, current federal legislation protecting the
data of American citizens is ambiguous and not consistently applied. A recent pair of high-
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1
Glossary ofTerms, HARVARD UNIV. , http://cyber.law.harvard .edu/readinessguide/g lossary.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2012) (definition of"information age").
2
What Is Big Data?, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/software/data/bigdata/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
3 Jd.
4
Data Capacity Converter Online, UNITARIUM.COM, http://www.unitarium.com/data?unit=g1 &vaJ=2.5e+ 18_(1ast
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (one-hundred page books, twenty-five gigabyte Blu-Ray discs).
5
See JENNIFER M. URBAN ET AL, BERKELEY CENTER FOR LAW & TE HNOLOGY, UC-BERKELEY SCI-IOOL OF LAW,
MOBILE PHONES AND PRIVACY 8-9 (20 12), available at http://papers.ssm .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2 103405
6
See Declan McCullagh, Verizon Draws Fire For Monitoring App Usage, Browsing Habits , CNET.COM (Oct. 16,
2012, 5:00AM), http: //news.cnet.com/830 l-13578 3-57533001-38.
7
U.S. CONST. amend . IV.
8
See infra Pmt LA.

profile federal cases regarding the privacy of a person's location information has brought this
issue to the fore. 9 In United States v. Jones , 10 the Supreme Court decided a case in which the
government placed a global positioning system ("GPS")

11

device onto a criminal defendant's car

in order to track his location. 12 The government did not have a valid warrant. 13 In United States

v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit decided a case in which the government tracked a criminal
defendant using location data produced by the defendant's cell phone. 14
The current federal regime 15 relied upon to safeguard personal location data is confusing
and uncertain, leading inexorably to the conclusion that it is ill-suited to the purpose. Congress
must act on this truth 16 by enacting far-sighted and comprehensive legislation that is
technologically agnostic and cognizant of four important dichotomies: (1) The Fact of Location
vs. Location Data, (2) Unrevealed Data vs. Revealed Data, (3) Historical Data vs. Prospective
Data, and (4) Point-In-Time Surveillance vs. Durational Surveillance. This Note suggests that
legislators should use this gaping hole in the law as an opportunity to construct a measure that
protects location data privacy immediately and serves as a test case for comprehensive reform of
privacy legislation for all forms of personal data in the future. If such a law was wisely and
precisely drafted, it would not only stand as a model for data privacy laws in the future but could

become the data privacy law of the future through careful amendment.

The hope is that

legislators will be able to flesh out a complete, coherent piece of legislation that protects both
9

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (20 12) and United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 20 12), reh 'g and
reh 'g en bane denied (Sept.. 26, 20 12), p etition for cert. fil ed (U.S . Dec. 26 , 20 12).
10
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947.
11
The global positioning system is a network of satellites, run by the United States ' military that can be used to
determine a person' s longitude, latitude, and altitude through the use of a portable device. DANIEL KLEPPNER,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF ATOMIC CLOCKS 1, 7 (Gary
Taubes, ed. , 1997), available at http: //www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.pdf.asp?a=458.
12
Jones , 132 S. Ct. at 947.
13
!d. at 948 n.l.
14
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774.
15
"Current federal regime" refers to the Fourth Amendment and certain federal statutes. See infra, Part I.B.
16
Because of Congress ' past activity in this area and Congress ' proposals in this same area, it stands to reason that it
has significant interest in this area. See infra Part 1.8.
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personal privacy and public interest based on this framework.
In Part I, this Note explores the difficulties inherent in the law currently used to protect
user data. Part I then goes on to discuss some general difficulties that legislators and judges have
in understanding technology. Part I finishes by showing that judges have concluded there is little
they can do to clear up the confusion and the solution must come from the legislature. In Part II,
this Note discusses the disparity in the pace of legislative development and technological
development, and clarifies the scope of the proposed legislation. Part II concludes by providing
examples of technology not covered by current legislation and which remains outside the ambit
of typical contemporary legislative proposals.

In Part III, this Note discusses the important

dichotomies that surface when scrutinizing possible practical and historical bases for a legislative
framework, and then discusses other criteria and why they should be discarded. In Part IV, this
Note proposes a set of comprehensive definitions for use in the framework and offers a matrix of
location data categories, prioritized according to an analysis of the four important dichotomies.

I. Present Protection: Confusing, Uncertain and Ill-Suited

Currently, individuals may defend against a government entity ' s search or seizure of
location data in two principle manners. The first, and arguably the most natural, is by appeal to
the Fourth Amendment. 17 The second is by invoking the Electronic Com1nunications Privacy
Act ("ECPA").

18

There are fewer options when defending against privacy violations by private

entities, such as cell phone service providers. In the private context, a person may only resort to

17

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). The ECPA is sometimes
referred to as the Stored Communications Act. See, e. g. , United States v. Graham , 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 386 (D .
Md. 2012); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1033 (2010) [hereinafter Apply ing the Fourth Amendment]. This appears to be a misnomer based on th e name
given to Chapter 121 ofTitle 18 ofthe United States Code: Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access . See Orin S. Kerr, A User 's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A
Legislator's Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WAS H. L. REV. 1208, 1208 n.l (2004) [hereinafter A User 's Guide].
18

3

the ECPA. Unfortunately, neither the Fourth Amendment nor the ECP A offers much relief.
A.

The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment is generally ill-suited to protect location data against private or

government intrusion. The Fourth Amendment offers no protection against intrusion by private
actors, 19 and as against government intrusion, the Supreme Court holds that persons travelling in
public have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from one place to another
because such movements are open to public scrutiny. 20

United States v. Knotts serves as a useful starting point in examining how the Fourth
Amendment is ill suited to protect location data.

21

In Knotts, police placed a tracking "beeper" in

a five-gallon container of chloroform with consent of the container's then owner. 22 The Court
explained that "[a] beeper is a radio transmitter ... which emits periodic signals that can be
picked up by a radio receiver." 23 One of the Knotts defendants, an alleged drug manufacturer,
subsequently purchased and transported the five-gallon container to another location?

4

The

defendant travelled mainly on "public streets and highways" to a second location. 25 The police
tracked him "using both visual surveillance and a monitor." 26

The "monitor" "received the

signals sent from the beeper. " 27 The Court held that the suspect's reasonable expectation of
privacy had not been infringed because "the information obtained- the location of the
automobile carrying the [beeper] on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded [beeper] in

19

For those unfamiliar with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see generally 2 Treatise on Const. L. § 16.l(a) (5th
ed.).
20
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,281 (1983).
21
I d. at 276.
22
ld. at 277-78.
23
ld. at 277.
24
I d. at 277-78.
25
Jd. at 281.
26
Knotts , 460 U.S . at 278.
27

/d.

4

open fields near Knotts' cabin-had been voluntarily ·conveyed to the public. " 28 Location data
was clearly at issue in Knotts, but it is important to note the police owned and operated the
tracking device used. 29
The Sixth Circuit extended the sensible holding of Knotts- and indeed relied heavily
upon it-to leave unprotected, location data produced by technology owned and operated by an
individual. 30

In Skinner, police obtained "an order from a federal magistrate judge ...

authorizing the phone company to release subscriber information, cell site information, GPS realtime location, and 'ping' data" for two cell phone numbers. 31

The "order" granted was

something less than a search warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment. 32 Skinner, an
alleged drug trafficker, was using one of the phone numbers in question. 33 The police used the
data obtained through the order to locate Skinner and arrest him. 34 The police did not "conduct
any type of visual surveillance." 35 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment
was not violated because "Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data
given off by his ... cell phone."36 Many lower federal courts agree with this holding, 37 even

28

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951-52 (citing Knotts , 460 U.S. at 281-82) .
See Knotts, 460 U.S . at 278 (" officers installed a beeper inside a five gallon container").
30
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777.
31
Jd. at 776. Cell site information, GPS location data, and ping data are three different methods of tracking the
location of a properly equipped cell phone. Stephanie K. Pel! & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now ?:
Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data Th at Congress Could Enact, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 126-29 (2012).
32
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776-77. Skinner challenged the use of the information " emitted from " his cell phone on
Fourth Amendment grounds . !d. Among the reasons given for rejecting the challenge, a magistrate judge opined
that " Skinner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone. " !d. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge's opinion. !d.
33
!d. at 775.
34
!d. at 776.
29

Jd.
I d. at 777.
37
See, e .g. , United States v. Suarez-Blanca, CR 1:07CR0023MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr.
21 , 2008) ("The Court concludes that the government's acquisition of cell site information did not violate the
defendant' s Fourth Amendment rights."); Graham , 846 F. Supp. at 389 (" [T]his Court concludes that the Defendants
in this case do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the
government."); United States v. Madison, 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (" [T]he thirdparty-disclosure doctrine ... requires the finding that society is not prepared to recognize as leg itimate any
35
36
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while some have held that the Fourth Amendment does protect cell phone location records. 38
While Knotts seems rightly decided, Skinner is problematic for two reasons. First, the
police in Skinner relied heavily upon "ping data," 39 but the court's holding specifically
references data "emanating from" 40 or "given off' 41 by a person's cell phone. "Ping data" does

42

allow police to track a cell phone. 43 However, "ping data" originates with a request from the cell
phone provider-in this case, at the request of police- to which the user's cell phone merely
responds. 44 In other words, "ping data" is not merely "given off' by a cell phone, it requires
active participation by another party. In Skinner, the police were not passive data collectors as
suggested by the Sixth Circuit. 45 This insight seems to undermine the holding in Skinner. 46 The
second problem is that future courts could read Skinner broadly to include far more than location
data. "[D]ata given off by his ... cell phone" also properly describes voice calls made from cell
phones, 47 which seems to suggest that the Sixth Circuit does not extend Fourth Amendment
protection to voice conversations had via cell phone.
In light of Skinner's loose analysis, it seems unlikely to maintain its vitality for long.

subjective expectation that Defendant might have had in the cell-tower location data for his cell-phone usage.").
See, e .g. , In reApplication ofthe United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In reApplication of the
United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (E.D.N.Y . 20 11) (" [T]he coUI1 concludes an exception to the third-partydisclosure doctrine should be applied to cumulative cell-site-location records.") (emphasis in original).
39
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776 (relating that police "continuously 'ping[ed]"' Skinner's phone).
40
!d. at 774.
41
!d. at 777.
42
While some may disagree on the propriety of it, see Simon Rogers, Data Are Or Data ls? , TI-IE GUARDIAN (July
8, 2012 5:30AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/20 10/jul/16/data-plural-singular, this Note uses the
noun "data" with singular verbs.
43
Pell, supra note 31, at 131-32.
44 !d.
45
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774 ("The government used data emanating from ... Skinner's ... cell phone to determine
its real-time location .... As a result of tracking the cell phone .... ").
46
Michael Hoven, Sixth Circuit Approves Warrantless Tracking of Cell Phone Location, HARVARD JOURNAL OF
LAw & TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 17, 20 12), http://jo lt.law .harvard .edu/d igest/telecommun icati ons/un ited-states-v-skinner
(collecting commentator opinions to that effect).
47
Voice calls on modern digital cell phones are merely strings of zeroes and ones as is the data traded between GPS
satellites and modern digital cell phones. See Fact Sheet 2: Wireless Communications: Voice and Data Privacy,
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www .privacyrights.org/fs/fs2-wire.htm #introduction (last updated March
20 13).
38
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However, its shortcomings-when combined with lower court confusion- highlight the fact that
the Fourth Amendment is not presently, and will not soon be, reliable for protecting personal
location data against government intrusion.
B.

Current Legislation
The federal legislation pressed into service to safeguard personal location data became

law in the 1960's and in the 1980's. 48 The three chapters of the U.S. Code implicated are
outdated. They are legacies from the days before personal computers or mobile phones became
common and before the internet was invented. 49 Congress developed the law in stages, starting
in 1968 as a reaction to the seminal Fourth Amendment decision Katz v. United States.

50

The

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 51 covered numerous, disparate topics. 52 Title III
created Chapter 119 in the federal criminal code and relates to wiretapping and electronic
surveillance. 53

The next significant step came in 1986 with the passage of the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act. 54 This Act extended the protections granted in 1968 to cover new
modes of communication, including email. 55 The Act also created the bulk of Chapter 121 ,
which relates to stored communications, and Chapter 206, which relates to pen registers, in the

48

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2513 , 2515-2520 (originally enacted in 1968); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709,2711,3121-3124,
3126-3127 (originally enacted in 1986).
49
See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question ofLaw, Not Fact, 70 Mo.
L. REv. 681, 701 (2011).
50
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (A lito, J., concurring). The Katz decision introduced Justice Harlan's now famous twoprong test to Fourth Amendment analysis. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan , J. , concurring)
("My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, ftrst that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ' reasonable. "').
51
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub . L. 90-351 , 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
52
Topics covered include: state ftrearms control assistance, disqualification for engaging in riots and civil disorder,
and confirmation of the director of the FBI. I d.
53
I d. at tit. III. Chapter 119 is titled the "Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications."
54
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
55
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1564 (2004).

7

federal criminal code. 56

Together, these three chapters represent the universe of federal

legislation protecting user data from government or private intrusion. 57
The concepts and examples codified by these statutes range from the quaint to the
downright incoherent. 58 A prominent incoherency is evident in the statute' s conceptual split
between an electronic communication service ("ECS") 59 and a remote computing service
("RCS"), 60 and the impact this split has on the privacy of email. At its most simple level, an
ECS "provides a service that supports communications by others. "

61

An RCS "either store[ s]

and/or process[es] information on [a] senders' behalf' and "provides a service that supports
communications to its systems." 62 An email service provider, like Google with its familiar
Gmail service, or Microsoft with its Hotmail service, can fall into either classification. 63 When
persons try to invoke the ECP A to protect their email a court must first determine whether the
email service provider involved is an ECS or an RCS. The incoherency arises because the level
of protection given to the email varies based on this determination. 64 And this determination
may turn on something as trivial as whether the email is opened or unopened by the recipient,65
or whether the email is more or less than 180 days old. 66

56

Chapter 121 is titled the "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access," and
chapter 206 is titled the "Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices."
57
See Mulligan , supra note 55 , at 1565-66.
58
For example, current law safeguards Americans from "[w]rongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records."
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988). While this section is quaint, it does not mean that a person's video rental history is
undeserving of protection per se. However, it is notable that the law currently ranks video rental histories in its
hierarchy of sensitive personal information while omitting location data entirely.
59
An electronic communication service is "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive
wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2002).
60
Remote computing service "means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by
means of an electronic communications system." 18 U .S.C. § 2711 (2) (2009).
61
Mulligan , supra note 55, at 1568.
62 Jd.
63 Jd.
64

For a more complete discussion of the difference between ECS's and RCS 's, see !d. at 1568-71 .
A User's Guide, supra note 18, at 1216.
66
See United States v . Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 201 0). "The government may obtain the contents of emails that are 'in electronic storage' with an [ECS] for 180 days or less ' only pursuant to a warrant.' The
government has three options for obtaining communications stored with a [RCS] and communications that have
65
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Furthermore, courts struggle to understand and apply these sections. 67 Both the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have expressed this frustration. 68

From a decision made at the dawn of the

internet age, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[u]nderstanding the Act requires understanding and
applying its many teclmical terms as defined by the Act, as well as engaging in painstaking,
methodical analysis." 69 Later, the Ninth Circuit observed that the ECPA "is a complex, often
convoluted, area of the law," and further noted that the "statutory framework is ill-suited" to the
modem age because it was written prior to the advent of the internet. 70 The court then lamented
"that until Congress brings the laws in line with modern technology, protection of the Internet
and websites ... will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the law." 71 The same is true of
wireless communication services, which did not become prominent until long after Congress '
last significant update of the ECP A.
Federal judges at all levels have similarly called for legislative clarity with regard to the
protection of location data. Most notable is Justice Alita's concurrence in Jones. 72 He first notes
that since the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 73 statutes- and not the
Fourth Amendment-have primarily governed privacy. 74

He goes on to advocate leaving

primary responsibility with legislators, opining that a "legislative body is well situated to gauge
changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
been in electronic storage with an electronic service provider for more than 180 days: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) use
an administrative subpoena; or (3) obtain a court order under§ 2703(d)." !d. (citations omitted).
67
Laura J. Tyson, A Break in the Internet Privacy Chain: How Law Enforcement Connects Content to Non-Content
to Discover an Internet User's Identity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1257, 1284-85 (20 I 0).
68
69

!d.

71

!d.
Jones , 132 S. Ct. at 945 (Alito, J., concurring).

Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994) (referring to the ECPA as "the
Act").
7
° Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. , 302 F.3d 868 , 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
72

73

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

74

See id. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring); See also, Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805 (2004) (suggesting that "statutory rules

rather than constitutional rules should provide the primary source of privacy protections regulating law-enforcement
use of rapidly developing technologies").

9

comprehensive way." 75

Lastly, Justice Alito laments that no action has yet been taken by

Congress. 76
Several circuit court decisions suggest that those courts agree.

In United States v.

Cuevas-Perez, the Seventh Circuit noted that the pace of change in location technology "tnay

make the legislature the branch of government that is best suited, and best situated, to act."

77

Cuevas-Perez was a case very similar to Jones. Without a warrant, police attached a GPS device

to a suspected drug distributor's car while it was parked in a public area. 78 The Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari on Cuevas-Perez and handed down its opinion a month after
Jones. 79 The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of
Jones, but the point regarding the legislature being best suited to act ren1ains. 80 In In re Askin,

the Fourth Circuit urged judicial restraint when faced with new technologies to avoid nullifying
"the balance between privacy rights and law enforcement needs struck by Congress" in the
ECPA. 81 The court also noted Congress ' effort to "legislate comprehensively in this field" and
frequent amendments to the ECP A. 82
The District Courts use similar language. In the United States v. Graham, the District
Court for the District of Maryland addressed the issue of whether government's obtainment of
historical location records from two criminal defendants ' mobile telephone service providers
violated the Fourth Amendment or the terms of the ECP A. 83 In its discussion, the court noted

75

Jones , 132 S. Ct. at 964 (A lito, J. , concurring).
I d. (Alito, J. , concurring). In Jones , the Court was concerned with the use of government provided "GPS trackin g
technology for law enforcement purposes," but the same applies to invasions of personal location data. !d.
77
United States v. Cuevas-Perez (Cuevas-Perez 1), 640 F.3d 272, 286 (7th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (U.S. 20 12).
78
!d. at 272 .
79
Cuevas-Perez v. United States (Cuevas-Perez 11), 132 S. Ct. 1534 (20 12).
76

80

Jd.

81

In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1995).
/d. at 106.
83
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 389-90 .
82

10

that "if the arc of technological improvement ... should be altered in a way that does infringe a
person's legitimate expectation of privacy, the solution is properly for the legislature to
address. "

84

Legislators should heed the judicial call and construct a new measure that both protects
location data privacy and serves as a test case for comprehensive reform of privacy legislation
for all forms of personal data. If such a law were wisely and carefully drafted, it would not only
stand as a model for data privacy laws of the future but could become the data privacy law of the
future with minor amendments.

II. The Peril of Devotion
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution designed the American legislative process to be
slow. 85 Therefore, it does not and cannot keep pace with changes in technology. 86 To make
matters worse, legislators and judges barely grasp technology. 87 Yet, legislators cannot abdicate
their duty sin1ply because the subject of their effort eludes them in both pace and comprehension.
Current legislation and most legislative proposals to protect personal location data are
flawed because either they place excessive importance on the use of certain technologies in
generating location data, or they require that the location data be generated in conjunction with a
third-party service.
84

For exan1ple, the definition of location data put forward by one pair of

!d. at 390.

85

Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of
Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1, 48-49 (2000).
86
Mulligan, supra note 55, at 1559; see generally Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law 's Race to
Keep Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, Fall 239 (explaining " why technological
change generates legal problems").
See, e.g, discussion of the shortcomings of the Skinner decision , supra Part I. A. ; Statement of Sen . Ted Stevens,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation , at 9:12 (June 28, 2006), available at
http://media.publicknowledge.org/stevens-on-nn.mp3 (commenting that "the internet is ... not a big truck, it's a
series of tubes") ; Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (20 I 0) (No. 081332) (statement of Roberts, C.J.) ("Maybe--maybe everybody else knows this, but what is the difference between
a pager and e-mail?"), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argwnents/argument_transcripts/081332.pdf; In reApplication ofthe United States, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45 , 49 (D. Mass. 2005) (acknowledging, in a frank
and forthright manner, a "dearth of technological savvy on the part of the [Court]").
87

11

commentators claims to be technologically agnostic 88 but curiously only protects a user's
location information if a "radio signal" is used to "deriv[e] or otherwise calculat[e]" it. 89
Another example, this time by United States Representative Jason Chaffetz, is similarly flawed.
His Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act ("GPS Act") only prohibits a person from
acquiring another's location data if that data is provided "by or through the operation of any
wireless communication device. " 90 He defines a "wireless communication device" to be "any
device that enables access to, or use of, an electronic communication syste1n or service, remote
computing service, or geolocation information service,

if that

device utilizes a radio or other

wireless connection to access such system or service." 91 The tether to specific technology in

Representative Chaffetz's proposal is in his reliance on a wireless radio connection to a third
party service.
The emphasis on certain technologies results in large holes in the regi1ne of protection for
personal location data. They may cover data created by current technologies such as GPS, or cell
phones, but they cannot cover other current technology to say nothing of leading edge
technology still in development, or technology not yet invented.
A.

Current Location Technology Not Covered
No one technology is necessary to generate location data, nor is any third-party service

required. For thousands of years people have used celestial navigation techniques to fix their
position and navigate from point A to point B. 92

Celestial navigation allows persons to

determine their position by observing the stars, the planets and other heavenly bodies. 93 The

88

See Pell , supra note 31 , at 151 (calling for a solution that accommodates "the pace of technological change to a
degree that renders it a moot consideration in any court's analysis") .
89
!d. at 179, 179 n.249.
90
H.R. 2168, ll2th Con g. (20 11 ), available at http: //thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?d 1 l2:h.r.02168:.
91
Jd. (emphasis added).
92
See generally, History, CELESTIAL NAVIGATION, http://celestialnavigation.net/h istory/ ( last visited Feb. 4, 20 13).
93
Bill Myers, Celestial Navigation, What are the Options ?, NA V.ORG , http: //www.nav.org/cel/introduction.html
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only equipment required to record location data from celestial navigation techniques are a
sextant, a clock, a nautical almanac (to detennine location),94 and a pencil and paper (to record
95

it). People still use celestial navigation to chart their location.

Granted, those persons are

probably few, but nevertheless, there is no principled reason why celestial navigators should not
receive the same privacy protection as GPS navigators.
The bigger current technology problem is inertial navigation systems ("INSs"). Briefly,
an INS uses sensors to "track the position and orientation of an object relative to a known
starting point. ... " 96 In other words, the INS takes readings from sensors and calculates how far
and in what direction the INS device has traveled from a known initial location to derive a
current location. An INS uses sensors similar to what some cell phones currently use to know
when its screen is rotated, 97 or what a video game controller uses to know when users swings
their tennis rackets. 98 INS units can be entirely self-contained,99 or used in conjunction with a
GPS device. 100 When used as a stand-alone device, an INS does not use radio signals to generate
location data. Even when used in conjunction with a GPS device, the bulk of the data could be
generated by the INS component rather than by the GPS component, depending on choices made
by the device's designers. In other words, the device could operate entirely without the use of
radio signals. When it does, it will fall outside the protection of the existing law and the majority
(last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
94 Jd
95
See generally, K. H. Zevering, Some New Dimensions in Sextant-Based Celestial Navigation Aspects of Position
Solution Reliability with Multiple Sights, 2 lNT' L JOURNAL ON MARTNE NAVIG ATION & SAFET Y OF SEA TRANSP., 271
(2008), available at http://www. transnav .eu/ Article_ Some_ New_Dim ens ions_ in_ SextantBased_levering,7, 104. htm I
96
Oliver J. Woodman, An introduction To Inertial Navigation 5 (Univ. of Cambridge Computer Lab ., Technical
Report No . 696 , 2007), available at http ://www.cl.cam .ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-696.pdf.
97
A Tracking Device That Fits On Th e Head Of A Pin, PHYSORG.COM (Oct. 5, 20 l 0)
http: //phys .org/news205500249 .htm I.
98
TAKAAKI SHIRATORI ET AL, CARN EGIE MELLON UNIY. , ACCELEROM ETER-BAS ED US ER INTERFACES FOR TilE
CONTROL OF A PHYSICALLY SIMULATED CHARACTER 2 (2008), available at
http://graphics.cs.cmu.edu/projects/wii/SIGGRAPHAsia2008 wii.pdf.
99
Woodman, supra note 96, at 5.
100
ld at 33.
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of proposed laws.

B.

Future Location Technology Not Covered
Although the seeds of GPS teclmology were sown in the 1950's, it was still the future

until1988. 101 The GPS's constellation of satellites was not complete until1993. 102 Just a few
years later, the technology became firmly entrenched in things like emergency vehicles, truck
fleets, shipping tankers and freighters, commercial airplanes, and personal automobiles and
watercraft. 103 Today, GPS devices are ubiquitous, but technology does not stop. Who among us
can tell in what direction location technology will move next?
The use of brainwaves seems pr01nising. A tongue-in-cheek suggestion to be sure, but
not one made solely for the tin foil hat crowd. Currently, scientists can capture brainwaves using
non-invasive technology. 104 They can use the captured signals- as they can fingerprints- to
1'dent1'fy a person. 105

While there is apparently no proven or practical teclmology for using

brainwaves to locate an individual, scientists are currently working on "the problem." 106 If such
a technology were to rise, one can imagine a vast web of installed technology that could replace
everyday things like elevator buttons, debits cards, or airport security. Of course, brainwave
technology will not generate personal location data any time soon, if ever, but humans are lousy
prognosticators. 107 No one has a crystal ball, which is exactly the point of keeping the law

10 1

Kleppner, supra note 11 , at 3-5 (detailing the history of GPS teclmology and time lining se lected events in its
development). In 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, on which American scientists performed proof-of-concept
tests that eventually gave rise to GPS as we know it. !d. Beginning in 1989, the 24 satellites were launched that
form the current GPS. Jd.
I02 !d. at 5.
103
Jd. at2-3.
104
L. Subramani, Students Create Brainwave Authentication System , DECCAN HERALD,
http: //www.deccanherald .com/content/77651 /students-create-brainwave-authentication-system.html; (last visited
Feb. 4, 20 13).
105 ld.
106
See id.
107
Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Tracing the Quote: Everything That Can Be Invented Has Been lnvented,
PANTENTLYO (Jan . 6, 20 11), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/0 I/tracing-the-quote-everything-that-can-beinvented-has-been-invented.html (tracing the quote: "Everything that can be invented has been invented"-
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technologically agnostic.

If the law codifies a specific technology, like radio signals for

example, it faces the immediate risk of gaps in coverage and unintended consequences as
technology shifts.

To avoid those outcomes, legislation tnust remain truly technologically

agnostic.

III. The Four Dichotomies
There are many possible criteria on which to build a legislative framework for location
data protection. Many potential choices are appealing, or even intuitive, at first glance but only
four survive scrutiny.

All four are dichotomies: (1) The fact of location vs. Location data,

(2) Unrevealed data vs. Revealed data, (3) Historical data vs. Prospective data, and (4) Point-intime collection vs. Durational collection.

A.

The Fact of Location vs. Location Data
Does Fourth Amendment protection diminish if the information recorded by a defendant

in his "papers[] and effects" is publicly available? Put another way: Could the U.S. Goverrunent
successfully argue a photograph does not receive Fourth Amendment protection because the
photograph depicts a public place? No, a court would rightly dismiss the argument. The proper
Fourth Amendment analysis, first announced in Katz, speaks only to the reasonable expectation
of privacy in a place searched, without regard for the content of the place searched. 108 By that
same logic, protection of electronic data should not diminish merely because it contains a certain
fact, or category of fact. However, this is not how courts treat location data. Courts conflate the

fact of a person 's location with that person's location data. 109 This Note suggests that a person s

erroneously attributed to Charles Duell , a former U.S. Commissioner of Patents- to 1899).
108
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
109
See, e.g., Cuevas-Perez I, 640 F.3d at 275 ("[I]n general: real-time information is exactly the kind of information
that drivers make available by traversing public roads."); Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775 (" In short, [the defendant] did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data emanating from his cell phone that showed its location. ").
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location information or data should be eligible to receive protection, without regard to whether
the underlying fact of a person 's location is protected.
If we consider the fact of a person 's location to be that aspect of reality that relates to a
11 0
person's position on the Earth, and that person' s location information or location data to be

such a fact reduced to a communicable form or fixed in a tangible medium, then it becomes
apparent that while the fact of a person 's location may be wholly contained within that person' s

location data, the two are distinct and deserving of separate treatment.
While the previous paragraph may appeal to the doctrinaire, it may not be clear. So, an
example: imagine the Grand Canyon.

Its "geologic color[s] and erosional forms decorate a

canyon that is 277 river miles ... long, up to 18 miles ... wide, and a mile ... deep. " 111 Those
are facts. 112 Now imagine a man standing on a ridge of the Canyon with a cell phone in hand.
The erosional forms strike a chord in him and he takes a photograph to preserve the memory of
his time with the eighth wonder of the world.

11 3

He looks at the photograph and sees a three and

a half inch reproduction of the geologic colors on his phone's screen. His photo is obviously not
the Grand Canyon; it is simply the visible facts of the Canyon recorded in a digital format.
Likewise, location data is not location. It is a record of the fact of a person' s location. Others
may freely access the facts of the Grand Canyon and even the exact spot from which he took his
photo, but others may not freely access the photo. The same should hold for location data. The
public may be able to freely observe a person while in public, but the public does not in fact-

11 0

This Note does not need to recognize a distinction between location data and location information . However, one
could consider "information" to be unrecorded and "data" to be recorded , analogous to the difference between
"work" and " copy" under copyright law. A "work" is an abstraction, an original creation of the author, while a
' copy" is a physical embodiment of the work. See 17 U.S .C. § I 01 (definition of " copies").
111
Grand Cany on National Park, NAT ' L P ARK S ERY. , http ://www.nps .gov/grca/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2013 ).
11 2
A fact is " (s]omething that actually exists ; an aspect of reality . . .. " FACT, BLAC K's LAW DICTIONA RY (9th ed .
2009).
11 3
Jayne Clark, The World 's 8th Wonder : Readers Pick The Grand Cany on, USA T ODAY (Dec. 22 , 2006, 9:03AM),
http:/!usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-11-23-7-wonders-grand-canyon _ x.htm.
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and should not in the law-have free access to that person's location data.

B.

Unrevealed Data vs. Revealed Data
The second dichotomy recognizes, tailors for the information age, and then incorporates

the Third Party Doctrine from the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In United
States v. Miller, 114 the Supreme Court first announced what is now known as the Third Party

Doctrine. 115 In accordance with this doctrine, a person "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government."

116

In other

words, "[b]y disclosing [information] to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth
Amendment rights in the information revealed." 117

The Third Party Doctrine is highly

controversial, 118 but "firmly entrenched." 119 The Doctrine's flaws are clear, as are its virtues.
Critics of the Doctrine assert that the Court was simply wrong in Miller. 120 In Miller, the
Court held that persons do not have "any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records." 121 A critic would say that the expectation of privacy in bank
records is indeed reasonable because there is no practical alternative to keeping money in a bank.
Critics also assert that the Doctrine grants too much power to the government.

122

It grants

virtually unlimited power to take business records, which is fully at odds with the tenants of

114

U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Wayne R. LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 1 Search & Seizure §2.7(c) (4th
ed.).
116
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
117
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 , 563 (2009).
118
Compare LaFave, supra note 115 ("The result reached in Miller is dead wrong.") and Stephen E. Henderson ,
115

Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us
Too, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 975, 976 (2007) ("The [Third Party Doctrine] was controversial when adopted [and] has been
the target of sustained criticism ... .")with Kerr, supra note 117, at 561 ("This Article responds that critics have
overlooked the benefits of the [Third Party Doctrine] and have overstated its weaknesses.").
11 9
Jack l. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the "Long View" on the Fourth Amendment: Stored Records and
the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 5 (2008).
12
Ken·, supra note 117, at 587.
12 1
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
122
ee Kerr, supra note 117, at 587.
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limited government and freedom. 123
Proponents of the Doctrine assert that the Miller outcome is correct even if the specific
holding is somewhat tenuous.

124

If it is conceded that persons have a legitimate expectation of

privacy in bank records, then disclosure to the bank implies consent. 125 Proponents also asseti
that if the Doctrine does grant too much power, then other legal doctrines successfully restrain
it. 126 Where all agree is that the Doctrine strongly affects the balance of public and private
interests. 127 The Doctrine's merits mean that it cannot be eliminated, but its demerits mean that
it should not be codified as currently understood.
The solution then is to concentrate on the definition of the word "revealed," common to
most formulations of the Doctrine. The question, for purposes of this Note, becomes: When
should personal information in the hands of a third party be considered revealed? In modern
society, one would imagine the spectrum of revelation is anchored on one end by a situation in
which a person walks down the street trailed by a 20 foot long rolling billboard that displays that
person's social security number in 3 foot tall letters. 128 The other end, one would imagine, is
anchored by a situation in which a person manually encrypts digital files and then stores those
. h a service
.
. yet again.
. 129
filI es wit
th at encrypts It

In the first situation, a person- without

question-fully reveals his or her information and it would be very difficult to justify a scheme
that even tried to apply Fourth Atnendment-like protection.

In the second, the government

probably could not access- as a technical matter-the digital information even if the third party
(i.e., the service provider) gave what data it had to the government (i.e., the manually encrypted
123

See id
See id
125
See id
126
See id Examples of other legal doctrines are evidentiary privileges and entrapment law. !d.
127
See id. at 575.
128
LifeLock, Commercial, YOUTUBE (Feb 6, 20 11), http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiQ92ZpTDZk.
129
See Melanie Pinola, How To Add A Second Layer Of Encryption To Dropbox, LIFEHACKE R (June 20, 2011, 6:3 0
PM), http://lifehacker.com/5794486/how-to-add-a-second-layer-of-encryption-to-dropbox.
124
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files). Of course, most information falls somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. The
law must account for as much of the spectrum as possible. It must allow access to information
on the revealed end and restrict access to information on the concealed end while giving courts
guidance on how to treat information in the middle.

C.

Historical Data vs. Prospective Data
The third dichotomy recognizes and largely incorporates the long-held distinction

between historical surveillance and prospective surveillance.
course, is accessing recorded information about past events.

130

Historical surveillance, of

Prospective surveillance is the

collection of information as it is generated. Analysis of this dichotomy begins from the premise
that the more information that one person knows about another, the greater the invasion of
privacy. The importance of this distinction is readily apparent and maintains its vitality in the
information age. Historical surveillance is less intrusive than prospective surveillance primarily
because historical surveillors know in advance what information is relevant and can collect only
that information.

13 1

On the other hand , prospective surveillors cannot know in advance whether

any piece of gathered information is relevant to the surveillor' s purpose and thus lawful. 132
Historical surveillance is less intrusive in a second way. The collection of historical data
1s necessarily limited to the span of time over which data is retained, while collection of
prospective data may be unlimited. 133 A relevant example is provided by retention periods of
cellular service providers.

In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a survey and

determined that the surveyed providers maintained cell location information for periods between

130

See generally, Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That lsn 't, 97

Nw. U. L. REV. 607 , 616-18 (2003) .
131 l d.
132 ld.
133

See Kevin McLaughlin, Th e Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are We?, 29

HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 421 , 432 (2007).
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four month and two years. 134 Even in the absence of legislated restrictions, cellular service
providers have no compelling commercial reason to retain location data indefinitely, so they do
not. 135 But, if required by law enforcement to report prospective data, the law enforcement
agency could easily maintain that data indefinitely and thus track a person indefinitely. 136
When it comes to prospective location data, there is an additional complication. Most
prospective data will likely be "regularly occurring" data. That is, most data generated will
come from the ordinary use of the device that produces the data. Some data however, will be
"on demand" data. That is, some data generated will be generated because a service provider
made a special request of the device to produce the data. 137 If the service provider placed the
special request at the behest of a government agent, a party might argue that the service
provider's act is analogous to the trespass that occurred in Jones. To date, no federal court has
addressed the argument of an intangible trespass in the location data context, but the prospect is
intriguing. 138
D.

Point-In-Time Surveillance vs. Durational Surveillance

The last dichotomy, Point-in-time surveillance vs. Durational surveillance, begins from
the same premise as the Historical data vs. Prospective data dichotomy. It further recognizes that
134

Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response- Cell Phone Company Data Retention Chart, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, http: //www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-dataretention-char1, (last visited Feb 5, 20 13) (reporting data retention policies for "Cell towers used by phone," one of
the means by which law enforcement agencies track cellular telephones).
135
See Allie Bohm, How Long ls Your Cell Phone Company Hanging On To Your Data?, AM . CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, (Sept. 28, 2011, lO: 17 AM), http: //www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/how-long-your-cell-phonecompany-hanging-your-data. Apparently, there is no legislated restriction on retention of location data; otherwise
there would be uniformity across cellular service providers. I d. In addition, if cellular telephone providers had a
compelling commercial reason for maintaining data indefinitely, they would. !d. (discussing the data retention
policies- as opposed to legal obligations-of major cellular telephone service providers).
136
It is difficult to find examples of what location data records from cellular service providers look like, but it
appears that the amount of information necessary to pinpoint a cellular phone at a given time is very small, and thus
maintaining records over long periods of time is possible. See Training Materials for Tracking Cellphone.s, N.Y.
TIMES 5 (Mar. 31, 20 12), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20 12/04/01 /us/celltraining_ documents.html
(providing an example from AT&T of location records in a slide entitled "Call Detail Records ATT Example").
137
See supra Part LA (discussing the Sixth Circuit's Skinner decision)
138
And outside the scope of this Note.
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longer periods of surveillance can paint a more co1nplete picture of a person ' s movements and
thus are more intrusive than shorter periods of surveillance.
The dichotomy positions point-in-time surveillance against durational surveillance
because the two differ in kind, not merely degree. Whereas varying durations differ merely in
degree. To illustrate, take as an example ordinary police work at the scene of a bank robbery in
1980. 139 Without raising substantial privacy concerns, police collect information from observant
persons or publically positioned-not necessarily publically owned or operated- recording
devices available at the time and place in question. Surveillance of a more substantial duration
of any given person is more extraordinary in these moments. This dichotomy seeks to grant the
same abilities and li1nitations while allowing police to take advantage of the modern
technological advancements.
The attempt to analogize to historical methods, however, does not result in a perfect fit.
The two situations do differ in that taking a person's personal location data will affirmatively
disclose the person ' s device's location. Whereas, speaking with studiously observant persons or
viewing publically positioned recording devices has a more limited chance of success. For this
reason, point-in-time surveillance still needs some procedural checks.

E.

Content Data vs. Non-Content Data and Why It Should Be Disregarded
Many possible dichotomies exist that could form the basis of personal location data

protection scheme.

Only four are important enough to codify; they are discussed above. 140

Notable for its absence from the list is the Content Data vs. Non-Content Data dichotomy. It is a
fixture in most discussions of the Fourth Amendment and is historically significant. Therefore, it
warrants some discussion. As will be made clear, this dichotomy has outlived its usefulness and

139

140

In 1980, personal location services and data were not yet ubiquitous. See supra Part I. B.

See supra Parts III. A- D.
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should be omitted from any future location data legislation.
The Supreme Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence establishes a distinction
between "content" data and "non-content" data. 141 Content data is protected while non-content
data is not. 142 Congress incorporated this distinction into the ECPA.

143

The ECPA defines the

"content" of a communication to "include[] any information concerning the substance, purport,
or meaning of that communication." 144 However, as discussed above, the ECPA is a difficult
law to understand and apply in light of other complications.

145

The good news is that Congress

can and should discard the content versus non-content dichotomy.
The distinction first arose in 1877, in Ex parte Jackson. 146 In 1877, it was illegal to send
information about lotteries through the mail. 147

The petitioner in Ex parte Jackson was

convicted of doing just that. 148 The only piece of evidence against him was a letter that he
mailed to another man in New York. 149 The Court opined that "[!]etters and sealed packages ...
in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward
form ... as if they were retained by the parties ... in their own don1iciles." 150 The dichotomy is
significant in the world of physical communication because the government must take an
additional, intrusive step-beyond viewing the outside of the letter or sealed package- in order
to access the "content" of the communication. Namely, it must open the "letter" or the "sealed
package." The information on the outside is readily observable. This additional, intrusive step is
141

United States v. Hambrick, 225 F.Jd 656, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000).
Jd at *4.
143
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 251 0(8) (West 2002).
144Jd
142

145

See supra Part l.B.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S . 727 (1877); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 ( 1980) (suggesting
that Ex parte Jackson established the principal that sealed articles of mail may not be opened without a warrant);
Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 18, at 1022.
147
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S . at 727.
148 ld
146

149
150

ld at 727, 737.
Jd at 733.
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critical. As Ex parte Jackson makes clear, there is a difference "between what is intended to be
kept free from inspection ... and what is open to inspection .... " 151 Among the things intended
to be kept free from inspection are "letters, and sealed packages."

152

Among the things open to

inspection are "newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a
condition to be examined." 153 The two groups vary only in the fact that present in the first group
is a physical barrier between the inside and outside of the com1nunication.

However, no

analogous barrier is present in most modem era contexts
Commentators nevertheless identify an analogy between email and snail mail.

154

The

analogy is informative because on the surface, it seems like a good fit, but ultimately it fails. As
suggested, there is so-called "header information" in an email. 155 Header information is roughly
akin to the address information on a physical letter. Its purpose, among other things, is to reveal
to the carrier, the identity of the sender and the recipient such that the carrier can "properly deliver
the email. There is also the body of the email. The body of the email is very n1uch akin to the
letter itself (absent the envelope); it is the information that the sender is conveying to the
recipient. Typically, the sender does not intend that the carrier see this part of the email. It is
then suggested that header information should be considered non-content data and the body
should be considered content data. But, here is the failure: if a person has access to the header
information of an email, they also have access to the body of the email- one is not sealed from
the other. Header information is n1erely delimited from the body by lines of text. It is not
compartmentalized in such a way that an additional, intrusive step must be taken to get from the

15 1 !d.
152

!d.

153

Ex parte Jackson , 96 U.S . at 733 .
See, e.g., Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 18, at 1022-23. Snail mail is a piece of physical mail sent
through the U.S. Postal Service. Snail Mail, DI CTION ARY. COM, http ://dictionary .reference.com/browse/snail+mail
154

(last visited Feb 5, 20 13).
155

Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 18, at I 023.
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"non-content" portion of the email (i.e. , the header information) to the "content" portion of the
email (i.e. , the body). This is so unlike a physical letter that the analogy fails. A far stronger
analogy is between an email and a postcard. 156

If any part of a postcard is available for

inspection, the whole postcard is available for inspection.
·While the letter analogy fails, at least it presents a clear- if ultimately illusory- line of
demarcation between content and non-content data in the email context. The same cannot be
said in the location data context. The content/non-content conclusion varies by device, turning
on the purpose for which the device generates location data. Courts often find location data
generated by services as a byproduct (e.g. , cell phone services), to be non-content information.

157

On the other hand , data generated by services for which location data is the heart of the service
(e.g. , GPS-capable devices and GPS location data, "ping" data possibly qualifies here too),
would seem to be content data under the ECP A. 158
Another less-discussed but still important aspect of Ex parte Jackson is that the letter in
question was sent through the U.S. Postal Service. 159 In other words, it was placed directly into
the hands of the federal government, against whom the Fourth An1endment guards. Email does
not operate that way. Typically, email only passes through privately owned equipment and never
touches government hands (rather, equipment). This raises the question: Even under the emailletter analogy, when would the government, in Ex parte Jackson-like fashion, have access to the
156

E.g., Donald R. Lundberg & Jeffrey S. Goens, Ready, Aim, Disclose: Understanding the Power of the Email
"Send" Button in Your Law Practice, 55-MAR RES GESTAE 30,3 1 (201 2); LAWRENCE ROGERS, CARNEGIE
MELLON UNIV., EMAJ L: A POSTCARD WRITTEN IN PENCIL 1-2 (2001 ), available at http://nwl.cc/email_postcard.pdf
(analogizing unencrypted email to a postcard).
157
E.g. , In reApplication of the United States, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In reApplication of the
United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005); In reApplication of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76,
80 (D. Mass. 2007).
158
There does not appear to be any federal case law on point, but the definition given for the content of a
communication " includes any information concerning the substance ... of that communication." 18 U.S.C.A . §
2510(8) (West). When a person uses a GPS device, the only information exchanged is location data and the time.
Therefore, because the user is not looking to get th e time from the GPS devide, the "s ubstance ... of that
communication" can only be the location data. See Kl eppner, supra note 11 at 4.
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Ex p arte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 727.
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information "open to inspection"?

Under even the lowest legal hurdle imaginable, the

government would have to go to the private entity to take the email. The government would
otherwise not have access of any kind. Should this taking be viewed as an intrusive step, akin to
opening the letter in Ex parte Jackson? If it is viewed as the intrusive step, would that tnean that
.the entire email-header information and all- is "content"? These questions are not easy to
answer and are outside the scope of this Note. They are raised here only to make clear how illfitting the content/non-content distinction is in the information age. The analogy is simply no
longer useful.

IV. A Legislative Proposal
Armed with the understanding that legislators should avoid memorializing current
technology, we can better understand the focus of what we seek to protect. 160 The law must
focus on and protect user location data. It should not protect cell phone location data, GPS
location data, or the location data resulting from any other specific technology. 161

Personal

location information is worthy of protection regardless of the forn1 in which it is generated, or
the technological age in which it is generated. It should incorporate those aspects of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that best balance personal privacy with public interests and discard
the rest.
Because the chief concern of this Note is location data privacy, it makes sense to produce
a comprehensive definition of location data that establishes the boundaries of the proposal.

160

See supra Part II.

161

Therefore, we can disregard as unimportant the nature or identity of the device that aids in generating the
information, the nature or identity of the infrastructure that transports the information from point to point, the nature
or identity of the infrastructure that stores the information , and the length of time information is stored, whether by
an intermediary or terminal entity . We should also avoid references to the precision of the involved technology.
Current technology is already accurate and only getting more accurate. STMicroelectronics Enables "The Next

Step" in Precision 3D Location Sensing, STM! CROELECTRONICS (Sept. 5, 20 12),
http://www.st.com/internet/com/press_ release/p3325 .jsp.
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Conceptually, the definition will cover traditional and non-traditional uses of established and
future technology. Also, the definition will cover location information at the point of generation.
No distinction will be made between broadcast and recorded location information, or transmitted
and non-transmitted information.
The secondary purpose of this Note is to convince the reader that implementing measures
to protect personal location data could serve as a test bed for the larger goal of establishing a
coherent protection scheme for all personal data. To that end, erecting a firewall between the
current legislation "protecting" personal data from the proposed legislation to protect personal
location data becomes important. An effective firewall requires a precise definition of location
data.

In the future- provided the test is successful- this firewall becomes 1noot.

Personal

location data then becomes but one prong of a personal data definition.
A.

Definitions Peculiar To Location Data
Up until this point, this Note has discussed a person's location data, but in reality, a

person cannot generate location data in the absence of a device, whether that device is the state
of the art, or the lowly pencil. Regardless of the technology involved, location data can only
capture a device's location-yes, including brainwave technology- and only by extension, a
person's location. Knowing that, the legislative framework begins with the following proposed
definitions:
1. The "fact of a device's location" is that aspect of reality that relates to the

device ' s position on the Earth.
2. "Location data" is the fact of a device's location reduced to a communicable
form or fixed in a tangible medium.
3. "Personal location data" is any location data generated using any method now
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known or later developed 162 by, or in conjunction with, any device owned or
operated by a user that establishes the absolute or relative position of that
device. 163
These definitions accomplish two things.

First, they codify the first of the four proposed,

important dichotomies. 164 Second, they exclude data generated "by, or in conjunction with, any
device" not "owned or operated by a user" from the definition of personal location data.
The second is significant because it preserves the legal reasoning behind the Knotts line
of cases. As previously discussed, Knotts dealt with the location data generated by a policeoperated tracking device planted in a barrel of liquid used to make methan1phetamine. 165 The
Court held this method of monitoring a person's location did not violate the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. 166 Because the police operated (and presumably owned) the device, the

Knotts line of cases will remain intact even after these definitions pass into law.

B.

Definitions Applicable To All Data
The remaining proposed dichotomies need not be specific to location data. In order to

codify them, additional definitions are necessary:
4. "Revealed" data is that which is (1) given by a person to the public or to any
other person indiscriminately, (2) generated solely by a person, or in
conjunction by the person with one or more third parties, and provided by the

162

The helpful phrase "any method now known or later developed" is borrowed from the very forward-looking, and
technologically agnostic, Copyright Law of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (20 10) (definition of"copies" and
"phonorecords").
163
The astute reader will recognize that my brainwave surveillance example from Part ll.B. will probably fall
outside this defmition of personal location data. That is unless a user owns or operates the brainwave scanners that
are generating the location data. However, the point earlier was merely that brainwave technology has a plausible
use in generating location data, not that that specific application of the technology should create personal location
data subject to protection.
164
The Fact of Location vs. Location Data. See supra, Part liLA.
165
Knotts , 460 U.S. at 277-79.
166
!d. at 285.
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person to a third party for the purpose of the third party's interaction, or
(3) generated solely by one or more third parties.
5. "Unrevealed" data is that which is not revealed.
These two definitions establish the default position of the law, which is to consider information
unrevealed unless specifically considered revealed by Congress. Three bodies of information are
"revealed" under this definition. Body (1) covers the rolling billboard example

167

and includes

any information that a person has indisputably revealed. Body (2), for example, will consider
revealed dialed telephone digits and email addresses sent through an email service. It would not
consider revealed the words spoken during a phone call or the subject line of an email. A person
does not speak words or provide the subject line to a third party so the third party may interact
with them. The service merely carries them from the sender to the recipient. Mere possession of
information by a third party or simple carriage of information by the third party would not reveal
the possessed/carried information under this definition.

Nor will information generated in

conjunction with a third party automatically be considered revealed. Significant in the location
data context, cell tower records and GPS records because both require a user device and third
party service. Body (3) will consider revealed information like credit card records and utility
records. Body (3) probably does not have much significance in the location data context.
Incorporating the Historical data vs. Prospective data dichotomy does not require any
novel definitions, but for the sake of completeness:
6. "Historical" surveillance is the retrieval of data generated over a period of
time prior to the initial request for the data.
7. "Prospective" surveillance is the retrieval of data that includes any data
generated over a period of time subsequent to the initial request for the data.
167

Supra, Part TU.B.
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The definitions used to implement the Point-in-time surveillance vs. Durational
surveillance dichotomy require some judgment. Of course, the number of categories and the
bounds of each are somewhat arbitrary and thus subject to a policy determination by Congress.
Here is one possible set of definitions:
8. "Point-in-time" surveillance is the retrieval of data generated over a period of
time equal to or shorter than 1 minute.
9. " Short-term" surveillance is the retrieval of data generated over a period of
time longer than 1 minute but equal to or shorter than 120 hours.
10. "Long-term" surveillance is the retrieval of data generated over a period of
time longer than 120 hours but equal to or shorter than the statutory
maximum.

C.

Category Matrices
Below are the category matrices first mentioned in the introduction. They attempt to

make visual the relative importance of each of the four important dichotomies. They then offer a
measure of in1portance, relative to the other data categories and thus give life to the remaining
dichotmnies.
H"ts t onca
. 1

II

Revealed

Unrevealed

Point-in-Time

Very Low

Low

Short Duration

Low

Medium

Long Duration

Medium

High

Revealed

Unrevealed

Point-in-Time

Low

Medium

Short Duration

Medium

High

Long Duration

High

Very High

p rospec t"tve
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V. Conclusion
Modern technology has moved American society beyond the point where the Supreme
Court is willing to extend Fourth Amendment protection. Current federal legislation attempts to
fill the privacy gap but is anachronistic and obsolete. The personal location data context presents
a clear example of the importance of this issue. Without intending the result, Americans have
allowed their personal technology to become tracking devices.

It is time for Congress to

recognize the importance of the issue and enact far-sighted and comprehensive legislation that is
technologically agnostic and cognizant of four important dichotomies.

The legislative

framework suggested by this Note will restore the privacy/security balance envisioned by the
Fourth Amendment for the foreseeable future.
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